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INTO THE TWILIGHT ZONE: ADMISSIBILITY OF
SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN MONTANA
AFTER DAUBERT
Robert L. Sterup"
I. INTRODUCTION
Expert testimony has taken on even greater importance in
the courts in recent years. Perhaps on no single subject matter is
the task of the trial judge more taxing than the admissibility of
expert opinion. It is not unusual for parties litigant to come to
Court armed with numerous expert witnesses, prepared to testify
on numerous substantive areas. While in most cases the admissi-
bility of a particular expert opinion will turn on one or two es-
sential issues, it often happens the trial judge is called upon to
address and resolve a half dozen or more threshold evidentiary
issues whenever an expert is called to testify.
The difficult nature of a trial judge's task is exemplified in
the admission of expert "scientific" opinion. As stated by the D.C.
Circuit Court, somewhere in that "twilight zone" at the cutting
edge of technology the "evidential force of a principle must be
recognized."1 Under the Daubert test first enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in 1993,2 and as adopted by the
Montana Supreme Court in 1994, the trial judge must apply a
discrete two-part, multi-factor test whenever an expert is called
to testify regarding "scientific" matters. Despite the apparent
uniformity of this rule, the reasoning and analysis of the Mon-
tana federal courts appears to be at odds, however subtly, with
the interpretation made and conclusions drawn by the Montana
Supreme Court. This article explores the divergent application of
the Daubert test by the Montana State and Federal Courts.
Following a review of the general tests of expert opinion
admissibility, and the role of the trial court in resolving such
issues, this article discusses the Daubert decision. Section three
addresses the federal applications of Daubert, and section four
emphasizes the areas of apparent disagreement in the post-
Daubert decisions of the Montana state and federal courts. Final-
* Senior Attorney, Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, in Billings, Montana; Law Clerk,
U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, 1985-87; J.D., University of Minnesota,
1985; B.A., Hastings College, 1980.
1. United States v. Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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ly, a proposal for uniformity follows for the purpose of reducing
incentives for forum shopping and inconsistent adjudication in
the courts of Montana.
II. SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE EXPERT OPINION-ROLE OF THE
TRIAL JUDGE
In general, expert testimony in the form of an opinion may
be allowed "if the specialized knowledge of the expert will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in
issue."' This fundamental principle, long a staple of common
law, is carried forward in Rule 702 of the Montana and Federal
Rules of Evidence. The Rule provides that a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education
may testify in the form of an opinion.
It is a truism that the trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether a witness qualifies as an expert in a particu-
lar field, or to limit the scope of expert testimony.4 Once the
trial court has determined that the witness is qualified as an
expert, further attacks on the expert's qualifications may affect
the weight the jury accords his testimony, but not the admissibil-
ity of that testimony.5 When addressing the admissibility of a
3. Smith v. Roosevelt County, 242 Mont. 27, 788 P.2d 895 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Schneider v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., 247 Mont. 334, 806
P.2d 1032 (1991) (granting wide discretion in determining whether to admit expert
testimony); Thomsen v. State of Montana, 253 Mont. 460, 462, 833 P.2d 1076, 1077
(1992)(citing Simpson v. White, 220 Mont. 14, 713 P.2d. 983Xholding that the court
may in its discretion limit the scope of expert testimony); see also Lindberg v.
Leatham Bros., Inc., 215 Mont. 11, 693 P.2d 1234 (1985); State v. Dahms, 252 Mont.
1, 12, 825 P.2d 1214, 1222 (1992) (holding that the determination of the qualification
and competency of an expert witness rests largely with the discretion of the trial
judge, and without a showing of an abuse of discretion, such determination will not
be disturbed); Foreman v. Minnie, 211 Mont. 441, 689 P.2d 1210 (1984) (holding that
the abuse of discretion must be plainly and clearly shown); Transcontinental Refriger-
ation Co. v. Figgins, 179 Mont. 12, 20, 585 P.2d 1301, 306 (1978); Cottrell v.
Burlington N. R.R., 261 Mont. 296, 301, 863 P.2d 381, 384 (1993) (quoting Cash v.
Otis Elevator Co., 210 Mont. 319, 332, 684 P.2d 1041, 1048 (1984) (holding that the
trial court is vested with "great latitude" in ruling on the admissibility of expert
testimony).
Where expert testimony is required to prove an essential element, as for exam-
ple the standard of care in a negligence case, and plaintiff fails to present such
expert testimony which establishes the standard of care or breach of that standard,
summary judgment may be appropriate. See Dalton v. Kalispell Reg'l Hosp., 256
Mont. 243, 846 P.2d 960 (1993) (issuing summary judgment where plaintiff failed to
identify expert to testify as to standard of care); Falcon v. Cheung, 257 Mont. 296,
848 P.2d 1050 (1993) (issuing summary judgment where plaintiff did not provide
competent expert testimony establishing deviation from standard of care).
5. See Wacker v. Park Rural Electric Co-op, Inc., 239 Mont. 500, 501-02, 783
2
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particular expert's testimony, the trial judge may be called upon
to assess a number of factors, as explained in the next sections.
A. The Expert's Expertise
The trial court first must determine whether the putative
expert has the expertise claimed.' "Implicit in Rule 702 is the
requirement that before a District Court allows a witness desig-
nated as an expert to express an opinion, some foundation must
be laid to show that the expert has special training or education
and adequate knowledge on which to base an opinion."7 The
party presenting a witness bears the burden of establishing, to
the satisfaction of the trial court, that the witness possesses the
requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training and education to
testify as to the subject in issue.' Thus, the expert must be re-
stricted to his or her area of expertise. In one particularly evoca-
P.2d 360, 361 (1989) (citing State v. Martin, 226 Mont. 463, 466, 736 P.2d 477, 479
(1987)).
6. That an expert acquired his or her expertise in preparation for trial is not
a basis for excluding testimony. See Price Bldg. Serv., Inc. v. Christensen, 215 Mont
372, 376-77, 697 P.2d 1344, 1347-48 (1985). In Linden v. Huestis, 247 Mont. 383,
807 P.2d 185 (1991) the court held that testimony by a medical expert as to
plaintiffs motivation for making complaints of physical pain was not admissible,
since the expert was not qualified to testify in that area. While the medical expert
was qualified to testify regarding where plaintiff was suffering from an injury, "he
was not more qualified than anyone on the jury to speculate about the plaintiffs
possible motivation for making complaints which (the expert) felt could not be sub-
stantiated by his physical findings." Id. at 388, 807 P.2d at 188; see also Dahlin v.
Holmquist, 235 Mont. 17, 21, 766 P.2d 239, 241 (1988) (quoting Kuiper v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 207 Mont. 37, 53, 673 P.2d 1208, 1217 (1983) (holding that "sec-
ondary gain" testimony excluded as being based on "speculation and guesswork").
One need not have practical experience in a given industry in order to qualify as an
expert in litigation involving its products, provided the expert's qualifications are
otherwise established. Knudson v. Edgewater Automotive Div., 157 Mont. 400,410-
411, 486 P.2d 596, 601 (1971). In Price Bldg. Serv., 697 P.2d 1344 (1985) the court
held that expert was competent to express his opinion as to a skill to which he had
no practical or personal involvement prior to preparation for trial, where the trial
court was presented with sufficient evidence of the expert's competence to justify
admission, and questions as to his depth of knowledge affected the weight and reli-
ability of the testimony, not its admissibility. And in Springer v. Opsahl, 229 Mont.
10, 21, 744 P.2d 884, 891 (1987) the court held that opinion testimony was properly
admitted as to whether plaintiff was employed by partnership or corporation, not-
withstanding that witness admitted he knew little about the subject contracts:
"Opsahl's testimony that he knew little about Springer's contract and the addendum
to the partnership agreement goes to the weight of his testimony and not the admis-
sibility."
7. Cottrell v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 261 Mont. 296, 863 P.2d 381 (1993).
8. See O'Leyar v. Callender, 255 Mont. 277, 280-81, 843 P.2d 304, 306 (1992);
see also Glover v. Ballhagen, 232 Mont. 427, 450, 756 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1988).
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tive case, the Montana Supreme Court held that a medical ex-
pert qualified to testify as to the pudendal nerve was not quali-
fied to testify regarding the sphincter muscle, where the expert
admitted the latter was outside the scope of his rather unique
calling.9
B. The Factual Basis
Even assuming the expert is adequately credentialed, the
Court must satisfy itself the opinion derives from a sufficient
factual basis. Under Rule 705 of disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the Court requires otherwise, "it is a matter
for the cross-examiner to determine the underlying facts on
which the expert bases his opinion and expose the weaknesses if
any of the underlying facts for the consideration of the jury."'0
However, there must be some showing that the facts upon which
the expert relies are the true facts of the case; opinion testimony
will not be permitted where the expert failed to do her factual
homework."
C. Relevance of Expert Opinion
The trial court must determine whether the expert testimo-
ny will be "helpful" to the trier of fact in resolving an actual
issue in controversy. As with any other evidence, there must be
a threshold showing that the expert opinion has a "tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the de-
termination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."' Stated negatively, expert tes-
timony will be excluded where the expert opinion is not neces-
sary for the jury to be capable of rendering a verdict. 3
9. In Nelson v. Davis Modern Machinery, 220 Mont. 347, 351, 715 P.2d 1052,
1052 (1986) the court held that a witness qualified to testify on chemical changes in
silage should not have been allowed to give an opinion on protein content of silage
for purposes of damages calculations where witness not so qualified.
10. See Jim's Excavating Serv., Inc. v. HKM Assocs., 265 Mont. 494, 510, 878
P.2d 248, 257 (1994) (citing Wollaston v. Burlington N., Inc., 188 Mont. 192, 201,
612 P.2d 1277, 1282 (1980)).
11. See infra note 151.
12. MONT. R. EVID. 401; See also Dahlin, 255 Mont. at 20, 766 P.2d at 241.
13. See Hightower v. Alley, 132 Mont. 349, 354, 318 P.2d 243, 246 (1945);
Lamb v. Page, 153 Mont. 171, 178, 455 P.2d 337, 341 (1969).
468 [Vol. 58
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D. Degree of Certainty
The trial court must also be satisfied the expert holds
her opinions with the requisite degree of conviction. Although
absolute certainty is "rarely possible" and thus is not required,
1 4
expert opinion based on possibilities or probabilities generally is
not sufficient.15 Thus, for expert testimony to be probative, the
expert's opinion must be that something is more likely true than
not true. 8
E. Permissible Subject Matter
Finally, the trial court must determine whether the expert is
testifying about the right thing, that is, a subject matter amena-
ble to expert opinion. An appropriate "subject matter" has been
characterized as one in which scientific, technical or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 7 A matter generally
qualifies where it is "not within the range of ordinary training or
intelligence," 8 is "too complex to be really grasped by the aver-
age mind," 9 or is sufficiently beyond common experience.2 As
the Montana Supreme Court observed, in matters with respect to
which a layman can have no knowledge at all, the court and jury
must be dependent on expert evidence.21 Conversely, where the
"subject is one of such common knowledge that men of ordinary
education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the (expert)
witness," then expert testimony invades the province of the jury
and is not admissible.22
14. See Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 358, 26 P.2d 973, 977
(1933) (holding that "moral certainty" only is required, "or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in the unprejudiced mind.").
15. See Farris v. Clark, 158 Mont. 33, 44, 487 P.2d 1307, 1313 (1971).
16. See Dallas v. Burlington N., Inc., 212 Mont. 514, 523, 689 P.2d 273, 277
(1984).
17. See MONT. R. EVID. 702.
18. Kelly v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 79, 181 P. 326, 331 (1919).
19. Wibaux Realty Co. v. N. Pac. Ry., 101 Mont. 126, 139, 54 P.2d 1175, 1181
(1935).
20. See Wagner v. Cutler, 232 Mont. 332, 757 P.2d 779, 783 (1988) (citing
MoNT. R. EvID. 702); Vandalia Ranch v. Farmers Union Oil & Supply Co., 221 Mont.
253, 258, 718 P.2d 647, 650 (1986).
21. See Itell, 181 Mont. at 207.
22. See State of Montana v. Howard, 195 Mont. 400, 637 P.2d 15, 17 (1981);
see also Demarais v. Johnson, 90 Mont. 366, 371, 3 P.2d 283, 285 (1931).
The necessity for opinion evidence only exists where the facts in controversy
are incapable of being detailed and described so as to give the jury an
1997] 469
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III. SCIENTIFIC OPINION TESTIMONY
A. Admissibility of Scientific Opinion-Frye and Daubert
Rule 702 expressly authorizes opinion testimony on matters
of "scientific knowledge." In the 1923 Frye v. United States deci-
sion, the D.C. Circuit Court reasoned that opinion evidence is
admissible if the scientific principle on which the opinion is
based "has gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs. 23 The Montana Supreme Court subsequently
joined many federal circuits in adopting the Frye test under
which expert testimony was not admissible absent a foundational
showing that the testimony offered a field of science that had
gained "general acceptance" in the scientific community.
The Montana Supreme Court signalled retreat from the Frye
standard in 1983, in the case of Barmeyer v. Montana Power
Co.' In Barmeyer, the court held that "the general acceptance
rule is not in conformity with the spirit of the new rules of evi-
dence."25 As explained by the court, "Unless an exaggerated
popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes
its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to
admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other
expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-
examination and refutation."26
Ten years after Barmeyer, the United States Supreme Court
sounded the death knell of Frye in the federal courts when it
decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.27 In an
opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court noted that Frye
predated the Federal Rules of Evidence by one-half of a century,
intelligible understanding concerning them; but when the facts are such as
can be detailed or described, and the jurors are capable to understand and
draw a correct conclusion from them without such opinion evidence, the
necessity for it does not exist.
Id.
23. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D. C. Cir. 1923).
24. 202 Mont. 185, 657 P.2d 594 (1983).
25. Id. at 193, 657 P.2d at 598 (citing United States v. Baller, 519 F. 2d 463
(4th Cir. 1975)).
26. Barmeyer, 202 Mont. at 193-94, 657 P.2d at 598 (quoting Bailer, 519 F. 2d
at 466 (citations omitted)). The Barmeyer Court also noted its earlier opinion, Stew-
ard v. Casey, in which the court stated: "Rule 705, Mont. R. Evid., mandates that
the opinion of a qualified expert is admissible, and if opposing counsel believe the
opinion is not founded on sufficient data, cross-examination is the shield to guard
against unwarranted opinions." Barmeyer, 202 Mont. at 185, 657 P.2d at 594, (quot-
ing Steward, 182 Mont. 185, 193, 595 P.2d 1176, 1180 (1979).
27. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
[Vol. 58470
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and that "[niothing in the test of (Rule 702) establishes 'general
acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility."28 Giv-
en the conspicuous lack of any reference to the Frye standard in
either the drafting history or the text of Rule 702, the Court
reasoned the "austere" Frye standard was not "assimilated" in,
but rather was "incompatible with" the Rule, and thus "should
not be applied in federal trials."29
In so ruling, the Daubert majority was quick to caution that
Rule 702 was not without limits. Rather, "under the Rules the
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." ° In fur-
therance of the trial judge's "gatekeeping" function, the Supreme
Court in Daubert announced a new two-part test: "Faced with a
proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must
determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the
expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2)
will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue." 1
The Montana Supreme Court was quick to embrace the new
Daubert test in Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees, Inc.32 Additionally in
State v. Moore, the Montana Supreme Court favorably referenced
Daubert, and cited with approval the "non-exhaustive" list of
relevant factors identified by the Daubert majority.3 In Moore,
the court expressly adopted the "Daubert standard for the admis-
sion of scientific expert testimony."34 In two subsequent deci-
sions, State v. Weeks,35 and State v. Cline," the court identified
Daubert as setting forth the governing standard for admissibility
of expert opinion under Rule 702.
B. Fundamentals of the Daubert Test
As noted above, Daubert sets forth a two-part test of admis-
sibility. As evidentiary "gatekeeper,"37 the trial judge is charged
28. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
29. Id. at 589.
30. Id. at 589.
31. Id. at 592.
32. See 264 Mont. 1, 870 P.2d 51 (1994),
33. 269 Mont. 20, 41, 885 P.2d 457, 470-71 (1994) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at
593-94 (1993)).
34. 269 Mont. at 42, 885 P.2d at 471.
35. 270 Mont 63, 891 P.2d 477 (1995).
36. 275 Mont. 46, 909 P. 2d 1171 (1996).
37. Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that
district court judges "continue to act as evidentiary gatekeepers").
1997] 471
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with ensuring that "any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."" The two-part
Daubert test thus obligates the trial judge to "assess whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifi-
cally valid. .. and whether that reasoning or methodology prop-
erly can be applied to the facts in issue." 9
The trial judge's undertaking is governed by Rule 104(a),
which authorizes the Court to determine "preliminary questions
concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness or the
admissibility of evidence."4 As characterized by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the charge of the trial judge is "to cletermine, pursuant to
Rule 104(a) and Rule 702, whether the expert is proposing to
testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in
resolving a fact in issue."41 In making this preliminary determi-
nation, the trial judge is not bound by rules of evidence, except-
ing those pertaining to privilege.42 The proponent of the expert
testimony bears the burden of proving admissibility by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.' In that regard, an opposing party
need not point to affirmative evidence "disproving" an expert's
methodology in order for the opinion to be deemed inadmissi-
ble." The trial court is obligated to make a "preliminary assess-
ment of the "reliability" of expert opinion "even in the absence of
an objection."' Although challenges to the scientific reliability
of expert testimony "should ordinarily be addressed prior to tri-
38. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
39. United States v. Jones, 24 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omit-
ted).
40. FED. R. CIv. P. 104(a); MoNT. R. Civ. P. 104(a). As noted by the United
States Supreme Court, when scientific testimony is proffered, the court must make a
Rule 104(a) determination of admissibility. Under Rule 104(a), the proponent must
show by a preponderance of evidence that the expert's testimony is admissible. See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10 (citing Bouraily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-
76 (1987)).
41. Hopkins v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 33 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 1994).
42. See id.
43. See Lust, 89 F.3d at 598.
44. See Ambrosini v. Labarmaque, 101 F.3d 129, 138 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
45. Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Gruca v. Alpha Thera-
peutic Corp., 51 F. 3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial court erred by
declining to rule on defendant's objections to the admissibility of plaintiff's expert
witness, instead permitting the witness to testify, then directing verdict for the de-
fendant, and stating that "[t]he district court abdicated its responsibility under Rule
104(a) by failing to conduct a preliminary assessment of the admissibility of the
plaintiffs expert testimony . .. before permitting the plaintiffs expert to testify.").
But see Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a Daubert challenge to admissibility was waived where the opposing party failed
"to request a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence in the district court").
8
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al,"' a formal hearing is not necessarily required. The Ninth
Circuit has held the trial court "is not required to hold a Rule
104(a) hearing, but rather must merely make a determination as
to the proposed expert's qualifications." 7
Although the parameters of the Daubert test remain to be
developed, state and federal courts generally are in agreement
on certain interpretive principles.
1. Reliability
Under the Daubert test, the trial judge is first charged with
assessing the "methodological" soundness of expert opinion. As
stated by the Montana Supreme Court, "there must be a prelimi-
nary showing that the expert's opinion is premised on a reliable
methodology."' The Ninth Circuit characterized the threshold
task of the trial judge as no less than to determine "whether the
experts' testimony reflects 'scientific knowledge,' whether their
findings are 'derived by the scientific method,' and whether the
expert work product amounts to 'good science."49
In tackling the reliability prong, the Daubert majority in
dicta suggested a "non-exhaustive" list of factors for consider-
ation. As subsequently adopted by the Montana Supreme
Court-and thus rescued from further characterization as mere
dictum-the "nonexclusive factors" include: (a) whether the theo-
ry or technique can be and has been tested; (b) whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publi-
cation; (c) what the known or potential rate of error is in using a
particular scientific technique and the existence and mainte-
nance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (d)
whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted or
rejected in the particular scientific field.'
The Montana Federal District Court and Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals likewise routinely cite the four-factor test sug-
gested by the Daubert dictum. 1 Thus, the trial judge cannot go
46. Hose v. Chicago Northwestern Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 973 n.3 (8th Cir.
1995) (citations omitted).
47. Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F. 3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 1994).
48. State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 56, 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996) (citing Moore,
268 Mont. at 42, 855 P.2d at 470-71).
49. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (citing Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593).
50. See Cline, 275 Mont. at 55-56, 909 P.2d at 1177; Moore, 268 Mont. at 41,
885 P.2d at 470-71 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593).
51. See Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473 (D. Mont. 1995);
1997] 473
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wrong by looking to the four factors at the outset. However,
because the four-factor test is not a "definitive checklist," the
trial judge may not rest after having combed through the item-
ized standards.52 Rather, the inquiry must be "flexible."53
Moreover, the trial judge must "focus... solely on principles
of methodology, not on the conclusions they generate."5' This
would seem to imply that if the methodology is unsound, then
necessarily the conclusions are "discredited"; however, assuming
the methodology passes muster, then the conclusions are admis-
sible, no matter how suspect the conclusions may appear to the
trial judge in his or her role as gatekeeper." Perhaps for that
reason, courts and commentators "have wrestled with the meth-
odology/conclusion distinction," 6 with some courts concluding
the distinction "has only limited practical import."" In Lust v.
Merrell Dow," the Ninth Circuit seemed to indicate that the tri-
al judge properly could scrutinize an expert's conclusions. The
United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has
suggested an additional factor: "whether the experts are proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted indepen-
dent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for
purposes of testifying." Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317. As explained by the Ninth Circuit,
a scientist's normal workplace is the lab or in the field, not the courtroom or the
lawyer's office." Id. at 1317. If the expert is not testifying based on research done
independently of the litigation, "the party proffering it must come forward with other
objective, verifiable evidence that the testimony is based on scientifically valid princi-
ples, such as a learned treatise, the policy statements of a professional association, a
published article in a reputable scientific journal or the testimony of other experts."
Id. The Fourth Circuit has identified yet another factor: whether standards or con-
trols exist over the implementation of the methodology or reasoning. See Cavallo v.
Star Enterprise, 100 F.3d 1150, 1158 (4th Cir. 1996). It is probably fair to conclude
additional articulable standards will be forthcoming in the Courts. It seems equally
clear that not all the enumerated factors will apply in each case. For example, the
Ninth Circuit has stated the third and fourth factors identified in Daubert-testing
and rate of error-do not apply "when the expert has not done original research, but
rather has surveyed available literature and drawn conclusion that differ from those
presented by the scientists who performed the original work." Lust, 89 F.3d at 597
(citing Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 n.4).
52. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
53. Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees, Inc., 264 Mont. 1, 870 P.2d 51 (1994).
54. Id.; see also Daubert, 43 F. 3d at 1318 (stating "[b]ut the test under
Daubert is not the correctness of the expert's conclusions but the soundness of his
methodology").
55. See Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1994). Put
another way, a trial judge who rejects facially absurd but methodologically sound
conclusions "oversteps" his or her authority, while the trial judge who excludes facial-
ly plausible but methodologically flawed opinion does not.
56. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1399 (D. Or. 1996).
57. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994).
58. 89 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 1996).
10
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court also held that a judge can exclude the opinion if it seems
implausible or improbable, stating that "[w]hen a scientist claims
to rely on a method practiced by most scientists, yet presents
conclusions that are shared by no other scientist, the district
court should be wary that the method has been faithfully ap-
plied" and "can exclude the opinion if the expert fails to identify
and defend the reasons that his conclusions are anomalous."59
On the other hand, even a sound methodology is subject to
being undermined if the data on which the expert relies are
faulty. So, for example, where the expert has relied on data "so
badly lacking" in substance his opinions could only amount to
"guesswork," the opinion testimony was deemed excludable un-
der Rule 703.' Of course, a complete failure to explain the
methodology by which expert conclusions were reached warrants
exclusion. In Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,61 for example, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District
Court of Montana, excluding expert opinion that plaintiff's ail-
ments were caused by exposure to chemicals in the workplace,
where the experts "failed to explain the basis of" their opin-
ions." Because the methodology was not adequately set forth,
the trial judge "could not make the findings required by Rule
702, and therefore properly refused to admit" the expert opinion
into evidence.6"
2. Relevance
Even assuming the expert's methodology is reliable, the trial
judge's work is not done. In what has been characterized as the
"fit" prong of the Daubert test, the trial judge next must deter-
mine whether the expert opinion "relates" to an "issue in the
case."" As stated by the United States District Court of Mon-
tana, the "fit" test obligates the trial judge to determine "wheth-
er the reasoning and methodology can be applied to the facts in
issue."' In that sense, a good "fit" seems to be one that is "help-
ful." As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "Rule 702's
'helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific connection to a
59. Lust, 89 F.3d at 598.
60. See Allen v. Penn. Engineering Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1997).
61. 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994).
62. Claar, 29 F.3d at 502.
63. Id.
64. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. The Daubert majority "stressed the importance of
a "fit" between the testimony and an issue in the case." Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320.
65. Livingston, 910 F. Supp. at 1494 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593).
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pertinent inquiry as a condition to admissibility."66 And as char-
acterized by the Ninth Circuit, in order to "fit" the expert's testi-
mony must "logically advance a material aspect of the proposing
party's case." 7
Consequently, opinion testimony does not "logically advance"
a proponent's case, and therefore cannot "fit," if the opinion can-
not be stated "in terms of probability or certainty"; mere "possi-
bility" is not enough.68 However, this "certainty" principle is to
be distinguished from evidentiary 'sufficiency'-while even a
"reasonably certain" opinion may fall short of independently
establishing an essential element of the proponent's case, the
opinion should not be excludable on that basis alone. 9 As noted
by the Second Circuit, the Daubert analysis addresses "admissi-
bility" not "sufficiency"-the "sufficiency inquiry asks whether
the collective weight of a litigant's case is adequate to present a
jury question" and, accordingly, "lies further down the road" from
a threshold admissibility analysis.7 0 Thus, as the D.C. Circuit
held, opinion testimony "does not warrant exclusion simply be-
cause it fails to establish" a point in issue "to a specified degree
of probability," rather, it is enough that the opinions "could aid"
the jury and are "sufficiently tied" to the facts.7" Of course, ad-
missible expert opinion may be insufficient to sustain a party's
burden of proof, in which case the court may enter judgment as a
matter of law under Rule 50 or summary judgment under Rule
56, as expressly noted by the Daubert majority.72 Nevertheless,
in apparent contravention of the admissibility/sufficiency distinc-
tion, some courts have excluded expert opinion on the basis the
expert was unable to make a causal link with "certainty."73
66. Daubert, 509 U.S. 591-92.
67. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1315.
68. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1322; Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1398.
69. In Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1996) the
Ninth Circuit pointed out the distinction between admissibility and sufficiency, hold-
ing that a Daubert challenge goes solely to admissibility, and thus cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal, where no timely challenge to admissibility was made.
70. In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 52 F.3d 1124,
1132 (2d Cir. 1995).
71. See Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 135-36.
72. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
73. See, e.g., Everett v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 949 F. Supp. 856, 858-59 (S.D.
Ga. 1996) (excluding testimony of expert who "admits he cannot state with any de-
gree of medical certainty whether [plaintiff's] medical conditions were caused by expo-
sure to chemical fumes"); United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1472 (4th Cir.
1995) (excluding expert testimony where "no evidence to link a non-proclivity -for
pedophilia with a non-proclivity for incest abuse").
476 [Vol. 58
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The "fit" requirement goes primarily to relevance, but is not
identical to the standard Rule 402 test of relevance.7' In assess-
ing whether the proffered expert testimony "will assist the trier
of fact" in resolving an issue, the trial judge must look to the
"governing substantive standard,"75 whether it be causation,
breach of duty, or some other substantive legal principle. 76 For
example, in United States v. Marsh,77 expert testimony on "de-
pendent personality disorder" was excluded where "the jury was
quite able to evaluate" defendant's position without the assis-
tance of expert opinion.78
What if the expert's methodology is sound, and the opinion
at least arguably would be "helpful" to the jury, but the expert
has not applied the methodology to the facts with precision?
Whether an error in "application" of a reliable methodology justi-
fies exclusion is problematic. In Moore, the Montana Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, concluding
that "[a]n alleged error in the application of a reliable methodolo-
gy should provide the basis for exclusion of the opinion only if
that error negates the basis for the reliability of the principle it-
self."79 Conversely, in In Re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litiga-
tion', the Third Circuit concluded that, after Daubert, "we no
longer think that the distinction between a methodology and its
application is viable," on the basis that "any misapplication of a
methodology that is significant enough to render it unreliable is
likely to also be significant enough to skew the methodology."8
The Eighth Circuit, in the decision followed by the Montana
Supreme Court in Moore, similarly stated that a "failure to prop-
erly apply a scientific principle should provide the basis for ex-
clusion of an expert opinion only if a 'reliable methodology was
so altered.., as to skew the methodology itself."82 Thus, when
confronted by an "application" error, as opposed to a "methodolo-
gy" flaw, the trial court presumably must determine whether the
74. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1321 n.17.
75. Id. at 1320.
76. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1397.
77. 26 F.3d 1496, 1502-03 (9th Cir. 1994)
78. Marsh, 26 F.3d at 1502-03.
79. Moore, 268 Mont. at 42, 885 P. 2d at 471 (quoting United States v. Marti-
nez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th Cir. 1993)).
80. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
81. 35 F.3d at 745.
82. United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (citing Paoli R.R., 916 F.2d
at 858); (8th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th
Cir. 1993) (citing Paoli R.R., 916 F.2d at 858).
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application gaffe is so egregious as to undermine an otherwise
sound methodology. How the trial judge can do so without
impermissibly scrutinizing the expert's "conclusions" is less easy
to discern.'
Courts sometimes state that challenges to the particularized
application of a given methodology go merely to the weight, not
the admissibility of the evidence." In United States v. Hicks,5
for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that DNA testing
is "especially susceptible to contamination" and thus unreliable,
holding that the "impact of imperfectly conducted laboratory
procedures" is better approached "as an issue going not to the
admissibility, but to the weight of the DNA profiling evi-
dence." ' However, it is difficult to take such statements at face
value. If the application error undermines the reliability of the
opinion, then the objection most decidedly does go to admissibili-
ty, not merely to weight.8 7 From this, it should be concluded
that only those application errors insufficient to negate reliabili-
ty go to weight, not admissibility.
3. Special Dangers of Prejudice and Confusion
Finally, the trial judge must also apply Rule of Evidence 403
to proposed expert testimony, and even relevant expert evidence
must be excluded "if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury."' Indeed, the Daubert majority
noted that a judge exercises more control over experts than lay
witnesses when weighing possible prejudice against probative
value, due to the -high risk that jurors will place too much em-
phasis on the testimony of an expert.8" "Scientific expert testi-
mony carries special dangers to the fact-finder because it can be
83. See GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 55 (1996) (stating that "the di-
viding line between conclusions and methodology is obviously fluid," as is "the dis-
tinction between methodology, conclusions and correct application of proper methodol-
ogy... .).
84. See Beasley, 102 F.3d at 1448 (stating that in the Eighth Circuit, such
objections go "to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility").
85. 103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1996).
86. 103 F.3d at 846 (citing United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1154 (9th
Cir. 1994).
87. See Beasley, 102 F.3d at 1448. The Eighth Circuit found that alleged defi-
ciencies in DNA testing were not shown to "so alter the PCR methodology as to
make the test results inadmissible." Id.
88. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
89. Id. at 596-97.
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both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in
evaluating it," and thus the trial judge must "exclude proffered
scientific evidence under Rules 702 and 403 unless he or she is
convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an issue in dis-
pute in the case, and that it will not mislead the jury."0 In that
regard, the trial judge should consider alternatives to expert
opinion. The Ninth Circuit has noted that, though expert testi-
mony may be informative, the district court "is not required to
admit expert testimony every time a party is able to make the
threshold Daubert showing," but rather may exclude on basis the
opinions would "waste time, confuse or not materially assist the
trier of fact, or be better served through cross-examination or a
comprehensive jury instruction."9'
This is not to say the trial judge has carte blanche. To the
contrary, the trial judge errs in "attempting to evaluate the
credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of compet-
ing scientific studies," as for example by "conflating the ques-
tions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight
appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a fact-find-
er ... .. 2 Some courts have noted that "once an expert has ex-
plained his or her methodology, and has withstood cross-exami-
nation or evidence suggesting that the methodology is not de-
rived from scientific method, the expert's testimony, so long as it
'fits' an issue in the case, is admissible under rule 702 for the
trier of fact to weigh."93 The trial judge "must strike the appro-
priate balance between admitting reliable, helpful expert testi-
mony and excluding misleading or confusing testimony to
achieve the flexible approach outlined in Daubert."9
IV. SCHISM BETWEEN MONTANA STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
A. Federal Court Applications of Daubert
The Ninth Circuit characterized the Daubert test imposed on
state and federal trial court judges as an "uncomfortable
90. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1321 n.17.
91. United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding testimony
by psychologist concerning possible defects in eyewitness testimony insufficiently
reliable and a comprehensive jury instruction on eyewitness testimony is preferable);
see also Hicks, 103 F.3d at 847.
92. Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 134.
93. Id.
94. United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Rincon, 28 F.3d at 926).
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task." 5 The fact that the Daubert majority proclaimed its
"confiden[ce] that federal judges possess the capacity to under-
take this review" may or may not ease the load."
To all appearances, it now would seem the Daubert test
holds sway in both state and federal courts in Montana, thus
giving rise to jurisdictional uniformity. Unfortunately, however,
the state and federal cases show signs of incipient schism: Does
Daubert apply to all expert opinion, or merely to "scientific"
opinion? If the latter, does Daubert apply to all scientific opinion,
or only to "novel" scientific principles? Is Barmeyer still good law
after Daubert, and if so, can Barmeyer and Daubert be recon-
ciled?
1. What is Science?
As has been pointed out, Rule 702's reference to "scientific"
knowledge is disjunctive of the Rule's reference to "technical, or
other specialized knowledge."97 The Daubert majority limited its
discussion to the "scientific context," as opposed to the "technical,
or other specialized knowledge" also referred to in Rule 702.98
In Daubert, the Court stated, "the expert's testimony must be
based on 'scientific... knowledge,' thus implying a 'grounding in
the methods and procedures of science,"'9 and further explained
that "in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge' an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method.""°° Thus, it
seems the Daubert test applies only if the Court makes a thresh-
old determination that the expert proposes to testify as a scien-
tist on matters "scientific." In that sense, "[t]he distinction be-
tween scientific and nonscientific expert testimony is a critical
one."01 Unfortunately, "[tlhere is no obvious clear demarcation
between scientific knowledge and technical and other specialized
95. Daubert, .43 F.3d at 1317.
96. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
97. Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1993).
98. Daubert, 509 U.S at 590 n.8; see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., 3
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[03] at 702-46 n.10 (2d ed. 1991).
99. Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
100. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; see also United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921,
924-25 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the "first inquiry" under Daubert is "whether the
proposed testimony . . . was on a scientific subject," and that ."[iln order to qualify
as scientific knowledge, an inference or assertion must be derived from the scientific
method."); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997).
101. Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994).
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knowledge." °2 For that matter, even under Frye, it was not al-
ways clear whether expert opinion was scientific in nature, and
thus subject to the "general acceptance" test.0 3
"Social science" evidence presents but one example of the
difficulties inherent in the science/nonscience distinction.'" In
United States v. Rincon, °5 the proposed expert, an experimen-
tal psychologist, proposed to testify regarding the reliability of
eyewitness identification. The Ninth Circuit noted expert testi-
mony is properly excluded where the expert fails to make a
threshold showing his opinion relates to a scientific subject, and
affirmed exclusion on the basis that "no showing has been made
that the testimony relates to an area that is recognized as a sci-
ence.""° In United States v. Amador-Galvan,°7 however, the
same court held expert testimony regarding unreliability of eye-
witness identification was subject to Daubert. Conversely, in
United States v. Quinn,"° the Ninth Circuit concluded expert
102. GRAHAM, supra note 84, at 43.
103. See United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that
expert opinion based on play therapy with anatomically correct dolls held to be sub-
ject to Frye test). The science/nonscience distinction was vividly illustrated by one
federal appellate court: if one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able
to fly, an aeronautical engineer could apply flight principles of universal application,
and even if he had never seen a bumblebee in flight, could still be qualified to testi-
fy. On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that bumblebees always take off into
the wind, a beekeeper with no scientific training at all would be an acceptable ex-
pert witness if a proper foundation were laid based on firsthand observation and
experience. See Berry, 25 F.3d at 1349-52.
104. In his concurrence in part and dissent in part, Justice Rehnquist noted that
"[c]ountless more questions will surely arise when hundreds of district court judges
try to apply" the teachings of Daubert, including: "Does all of this dicta apply to an
expert seeking to testify on' the basis of 'technical or other specialized
knowledge'--the other types of expert knowledge on which Rule 702 applies-or are
the 'general observations' limited only to 'scientific knowledge?'" Daubert, 509 U.S at
594.
105. 984 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1992). Interestingly, Rincon was remanded by the
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Daubert, indicating at least inferential-
ly the Supreme Court deemed its new test applicable to the eyewitness identification
opinion at issue. See Rincon v. United States, 510 U.S. 801 (1993).
106. United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 1994). Having concluded
the opinion was not "scientific" at all, the Court went on to apply the Daubert "fit"
test, ultimately concluding the opinion was inadmissible on that basis as well.
Identical testimony subsequently was recognized by the Ninth Circuit as at least
arguably "scientific." United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1996). In Hicks,
the lower court determined that, even assuming eyewitness opinion was "scientific," it
would not materially assist the trier of fact, and so was excluded. Affirning, the
Ninth Circuit appeared to recognize the expert opinion could be scientific in nature,
but held the district court properly excluded the evidence. See id. at 847.
107. 9 F.3d 1414 (9th Cir. 1993).
108. 18 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).
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opinion on the use of "photogrammetry" to calculate the height of
an individual in surveillance photographs was admissible where
it "did not involve any novel or questionable scientific tech-
nique.""° Further, in United States v. Jones,"10 the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that proposed expert testimony on voice identifica-
tion was "novel," and that the expert had failed to demonstrate
any "scientific basis" for the opinion, particularly given that the
expert had no training on the subject, had written no articles,
and had done no research. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held
that under Daubert, the expert "failed to establish the scientific
validity of" his opinion, and thus was properly excluded."'
In United States v. Rouse," the Eighth Circuit applied
Daubert and held that the defendant's expert psychologist should
have been permitted to opine as to the "suggestibility" of tech-
niques employed by investigating authorities, and whether the
suggestive techniques "could have affected the memories" of the
children who testified regarding alleged abuse."' On the other
hand, expert testimony concerning the modus operandi of drug
traffickers was held not subject to the Daubert test, on the basis
it was based on "specialized knowledge, not scientific knowl-
edge.""" Thus, whether and to what extent a particular
expert's testimony qualifies as "scientific" in nature, and thus is
subject to Daubert, remains very much a moving target.
109. Id. at 1464-65.
110. 24 F.3d 177 (9th Cir. 1994).
111. Jones, 24 F.3d at 1180.
112. 100 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at 573.
114. Cordoba, 104 F.3d at 230. The lack of agreement in the courts on the scope
of Daubert is revealed by a survey of the case law. For example, in Petruzzi's IGA
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993) the Third
Circuit cited Daubert in evaluating an economist's expert testimony. In Hoult v.
Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1995). a Daubert analysis was applied with respect to
expert opinion on the psychological dynamics and clinical profiles of victims of child-
hood sexual abuse and repressed memory of traumatic events. Testimony of a long-
shoreman with 29 years of experience who proposed to testify that a workplace was
in an "extremely unusual and hazardous condition" was held improperly excluded by
the Ninth Circuit, where the opinion was not based on scientific knowledge but rath-
er on "knowledge, skill and experience." Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enterprises, 42 F.3d
1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994). In United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074
(5th Cir. 1996) testimony of a real estate broker and real estate appraiser as to the
effects of flooding on the value of real property was subjected to and found admissi-
ble under the Daubert test.
[Vol. 58
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2. Are Common Folk Experts Good Enough for Daubert?
At least some courts and commentators conclude the
Daubert two-part "reliability" and "relevance" test should apply
to all expert testimony, whether "scientific" or not. The Ameri-
can College of Trial Lawyers, among others, has suggested ex-
tending Daubert's approach to expert testimony in general.115 It
has also been noted, "Daubert has led to increased scrutiny of
expert testimony" in fields unrelated to the physical sciences,
"such as economics and other social sciences."116
The Ninth Circuit has rejected attempts to extend
Daubert to run-of-the-mill expert opinion, unequivocally holding
that "Daubert applies only to the admissibility of scientific testi-
mony."117 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the "special con-
cerns" which "arise when evaluating the proffer of scientific tes-
timony" simply are not present when "evaluating" other species
of expert testimony.118 At least some other Federal Circuit
Courts have concurred." For example, the Tenth Circuit has
held that a Daubert analysis is "unwarranted in cases where
expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training."2 °
As stated by another federal court, "[w]here a witnesses' opinion
is not the product of scientific methodology or systematic analy-
sis, but rather a conclusion based on years of accumulated learn-
ing and insight,.. . reliability should be assessed without resort
to these [Daubert] factors."21 Conversely, at least some federal
courts have looked to Daubert in evaluating admittedly "non-
scientific" expert opinion. For example, in In Re Aluminum Phos-
phide Antitrust Litigation,' the testimony of a damages expert
was excluded, the Court concluding:
115. See American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Deter-
mining Admissibility of Expert Evidence after Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571 (Dec. 1994).
116. Paul K Vickrey & Patrick F. Solon, Daubert Tightens Scrutiny of Expert
Witnesses in Business Tort Litigation BUS. TORTS REP., Oct. 1996, at 274.
117. Cordoba, 104 F.3d at 230; see also Central Office Telephone, Inc. v. AT&T,
No. 94-36116, 1997 WL 78442, at 83 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that there is "no indica-
tion" Daubert "is meant to apply to all expert testimony").
118. See Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1270.
119. See, e.g., lacobelli Const., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.
1994) (stating that expert testimony in construction contract dispute "does not pres-
ent the kind of junk science' problem that Daubert meant to address."); Tamarin v.
Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that Daubert does not
apply to testimony by accountant concerning payroll records).
120. Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996).
121. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 949 F. Supp. 171, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
122. 893 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Kan. 1995).
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[W]hile each of the [Daubert factors] may not be relevant in
determining the reliability of expert testimony on non-scientific
or social science subjects, the court has no doubt that Daubert
requires it to act as a gatekeeper, to determine whether [the
expert's] testimony and reports are reliable and relevant under
Rule 702."2
Likewise, in Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick,' the
Seventh Circuit held the District Court erred in admitting the
testimony of plaintiffs expert accountant without first having
vetted the opinion under the Daubert test.125 The expert em-
ployed a discounted cash flow analysis in opining the defendants
had contravened generally accepted auditing standards. Admis-
sion of this testimony was error, the Seventh Circuit concluded,
in that the District Court failed to conduct the preliminary as-
sessment required by Rule 104(a), and the expert "conceded he
did not employ the methodology that experts in valuation find
essential." 6
On the other hand, the first task of the trial court is to "de-
termine whether the expert's testimony pertains to scientific
knowledge," which in turn "requires that the district court con-
sider whether the testimony has been subjected to the scientific
method" and to "rule out 'subjective belief or unsupported specu-
lation."' So formulated, application of Daubert may yield the
conclusion that the witness is not a scientist at all, or for that
matter an expert, and thus his testimony must be excluded. A
witness who proposed to explain how a rope came to break foun-
dered on just such a conundrum, the Sixth Circuit determining
the expert testimony "was not based upon any 'scientific, techni-
cal or other specialized knowledge,'" and that in the complete
123. Id. at 1506.
124. 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993).
125. Id.
126. Frymire-Brinati, 2 F.3d at 186-87; see also United States v. Velasquez, 64
F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding the Daubert test "helpful" in assessing the testimony
of an expert on handwriting analysis and finding that handwriting analysis qualifies
as "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge" which is "properly the subject
of expert testimony," and also that the District Court erred in excluding testimony of
an expert who would have testified the "field of handwriting analysis" is "not a valid
field of scientific expertise because it lacks standards to guide experts"); see also City
of Tuscaloosa v. Harcross Chemicals, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (hold-
ing that the Daubert test was properly applied to expert opinion regarding a price-
fixing conspiracy).
127. Porter v. Whitehall Lab, Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
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absence of a valid scientific methodology as required by Daubert,
the witness opinion "was not expert testimony under Rule
702."' The court concluded this non-scientific non-expert opin-
ion was "precisely" the "kind of testimony that the Supreme
Court in Daubert admonished federal courts to screen for scien-
tific validity as a part of the court's 'gatekeeping function. '" ' 9
For now, it probably is safe to conclude the Daubert test
need not necessarily be consulted when a "non-scientific" expert's
opinion testimony is called into question, although it likewise
seems clear the Court in its discretion may at least consider the
implications of Daubert, if it deems it helpful to do so.
B. Montana Supreme Court's Alternative Application of Daubert
1. What is Novel Science?
The Federal courts have struggled to delineate the scope of
"scientific" expert opinion, as noted above. The Montana Su-
preme Court tackled the issue in Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees,
Inc.," which referenced Daubert in approving testimony of a
"human factors" expert, finding, without extensive discussion,
the expert "testified regarding scientific knowledge." 3' The hu-
man factors expert had a Ph.D. in industrial engineering, and
had established a foundation that human factors is a "field of
stud[y] that looks at human capabilities and limitations."32
That a "human factors" expert was deemed to be a "scientist,"
while an experimental psychologist was not," illustrates the
difficulty of drawing a bright line between scientific and all other
128. Cook v. American S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733, 739 (6th Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 139. Conversely, the fact that an expert's testimony was not scientific
in nature has been deemed to support its admission. In McCullock v. H.B. Fuller
Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995) the Second Circuit concluded that the opin-
ions were based on "specialized knowledge," and thus rejected a claim the opinion
was excludable because it was not "scientific" in nature, while further concluding the
testimony "easily qualifie[d] for admission under Daubert."
As recognized by the courts, "[tihe applicability of Daubert's analysis outside
the context of novel, scientific evidence is the subject of debate." Tassin v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1245 (M.D. La. 1996) (holding that Daubert was
confined to evaluation of scientific testimony); see also Compton, 82 F.3d at 1517-19
(holding that Daubert factors apply only to unique, untested or controversial method-
ologies); see also Cummins v. Lyle Industries, 93 F.3d 362, 367-68 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996)
(applying Daubert analysis to technical issues of product design).
130. 264 Mont. 1, 870 P.2d 51 (1994).
131. Id
132. Hart-Albin, 264 Mont. at 6, 870 P.2d at 56.
133. See United States v. Rincon, 984 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1992).
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expert opinion.
To complicate matters further, the Montana Supreme Court
appears to have layered in an additional test, by interpreting
Daubert to apply only to "novel" scientific evidence. While this
distinction was merely hinted at in Weeks, any doubt was laid to
rest in Cline, wherein the Court expressly stated: "Certainly all
scientific evidence is not subject to the Daubert standard and the
Daubert test should only be used to determine the admissibility
of novel scientific evidence.""3 4
That the Montana Supreme Court might have interpreted
Daubert as applying only to "novel" science is not difficult to
understand. The Frye court was concerned with science at the
cutting edge, that is, the point at which "a scientific principle or
discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demon-
strable stages ... "135 As colorfully explained in Frye, some-
where in that "twilight zone" the "evidential force of a principle
must be recognized." Unfortunately, that line is "difficult to de-
fine." 35 Under Frye, a particular scientific principle crossed the
line from "twilight zone" to legal admissibility precisely at that
point at which the scientific community bestowed its blessing by
consensus. Given that Frye parsed distinctions between "novel"
and "generally accepted" science, and that the Daubert majority
expressly undertook to administer last rites to Frye, it perhaps
was not illogical to conclude that the Daubert majority intended
merely to address admissibility of "novel" science, and did not
intend its ruling to apply to science which clearly had crossed
the threshold into general acceptability.
However, the distinction drawn in Cline between "novel" and
all other scientific opinion has not been observed in the federal
courts. The Daubert majority expressly stated its new test was
addressed to "any and all scientific testimony or evidence. ""'
As the Court explained, "Although the Frye decision itself fo-
cussed exclusively on 'novel' scientific techniques, we do not read
the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to
unconventional evidence."3" The Ninth Circuit in post-Daubert
134. State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 909 P.2d 1171 (1996).
135. United States v. Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
136. The problem has not gotten any easier in the seventy years since Frye was
decided, as the Daubert majority recognized.
137. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added).
138. Id.,
Of course, well established propositions are likely to be challenged than
those that are novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, theories
that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific
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decisions has stated the Daubert test applies to all scientific
opinion evidence, whether novel or not. In Claar v. Burlington
Northern Railroad Co., on appeal from the United States District
Court of Montana,' 9 the Ninth Circuit expressly noted that the
requirements of Daubert apply to "all proffered expert testimo-
ny-not just testimony based on novel scientific methods or evi-
dence.""4 Other federal courts have applied what might be
characterized as a sliding scale-the more novel the science, the
more likely Daubert will be helpful. As explained by one court:
"While Daubert's principles have valuable application in deter-
mining the admissibility of controversial and novel scientific
hypotheses, they have less use in fields like design engineering
where 'general acceptance' is the norm, not the exception."""
2. If Frye is Dead, Long Live Barmeyer?
The Frye doctrine arose in a criminal law context, and most
often was applied in criminal law cases." The Daubert test, in
contrast, arose in a civil litigation context, but has come routine-
ly to be applied in the criminal law context by federal courts.
The Montana Supreme Court expressly adopted Daubert in
Moore, a criminal law case. While the Court referenced Daubert
in Hart-Albin, a civil case, the doctrine has not otherwise been
explicitly adopted for use in the civil law context, although it
probably is safe to conclude the Montana Supreme Court will
apply Daubert to all civil litigation.
As noted above, Barmeyer put an end to the Frye doctrine in
Montana. Subsequently Daubert put an end to Frye in federal
courts. In addition, Daubert set up a new standard which did not
exist at the time of Barmeyer. It might be expected that, having
law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial
notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201.
Id.
139. 29 F.3d 499, 501 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994).
140. Id.; see also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding that "Daubert applies a test for admissibility of scientific evidence").
141. Officer v. Teledyne Republic/Sprague, 870 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D. Mass.
1994).
142. According to a 1993 survey, sixty-four of the sixty-seven reported federal
appellate decisions analyzing the admissibility of scientific evidence under Frye were
criminal cases, while not a single case decided by the federal appellate courts prior
to 1975 applied Frye in a civil case of any kind, and as of April 1993 only three
such decisions had been reported, two of which were decided in 1991. See Kenneth J.
Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AMER. U.L. REV. 1637,
1693-95 (1993); see also Graham, supra note 84, at 59 n.30.
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adopted Daubert, the Montana Supreme Court would discard the
once useful but no longer particularly germane Barmeyer deci-
sion. Interestingly, this has not been the case. Even after having
embraced Daubert, the Montana Supreme Court continues to
pointedly cite Barmeyer. As stated in Cline, "[w]hen we adopted
the Daubert test in Moore, we specifically noted the continuing
vitality of Barmeyer as that case pertained to the scientific evi-
dence.""4 Further, in Moore the Court took pains to point out
that "the guidelines set forth in Daubert are consistent with our
previous holding in Barmeyer concerning the admission of expert
testimony of novel scientific evidence."'"
Given that the Montana Supreme Court continues to cite
both Daubert and Barmeyer, a trial court judge might be tempted
to conclude that a particular proffer of scientific opinion is sub-
ject to not one but two tests, and that, where a particular scien-
tific opinion does not pass muster under Daubert, it may still
come in under Barmeyer. Thus, for example, a trial judge might
conclude that the expert's opinion has not been tested, is neither
subject to peer review nor publication, is subject to a high poten-
tial rate of error, and is not generally accepted in the scientific
community. Thus, this judge may conclude that this opinion is
patently inadmissible under Daubert. However, this same judge
might nonetheless also conclude that, under Barmeyer, these
infirmities go only to the weight of the opinion, and, may further
assume that potential prejudice could be alleviated by vigorous
cross examination. As a result, this judge might conclude that
the testimony should be admitted.
V. TOWARD RECONCILIATION IN MONTANA STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS
The post-Daubert decisions of the Montana state and federal
courts appear to create at least some potential for an untenable
rift between state and federal rules of evidence. Under Cline, the
Montana State Court judge presumably must make a threshold
determination of novelty in order to determine whether Daubert
even applies. A federal court judge applying federal rules of
evidence is not so required. A litigant in Montana state court
presumably may rely on Barmeyer in the alternative to Daubert.
A federal court litigant could not do the same. To eliminate such
actual or apparent inconsistencies, a uniform framework of anal-
143. State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 45, 56 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996).
144. State v. Moore, 269 Mont. 20, 41, 885 P.2d 457, 471 (1994).
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ysis is next suggested.
A. Daubert is Not Limited to Novel Science
As noted above, in Cline, the Montana Supreme Court drew
a distinction between "novel" science and all other science. The
distinction appears to be untenable. To say a particular scientific
principle is "novel" enunciates a conclusion, not a framework for
analysis. By definition, a principle is novel only if it is new, not
widely accepted, at the "cutting edge," and thus presumably
subject to the evils of unconventional opinion, such as lack of
verifiability, peer review, adequate testing, and want of blessing
in the scientific community. The Daubert factors are designed to
assist the trial judge in determining whether a particular scien-
tific principle is generally accepted, verifiable, subject to a high
rate of error and so forth. To ask the trial court to determine
whether the science is "novel" before applying Daubert is to de-
prive him of the very framework of analysis Daubert was meant
to provide. As stated by the Seventh Circuit's Judge Posner,
under Daubert "a district judge asked to admit scientific evidence
must determine whether the evidence is genuinely scientific, as
distinct from being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine
scientist."" For that matter, a Rule 104(a) preliminary hearing
is uniquely well suited to application of the Daubert test. Where
the admissibility of expert testimony is in issue, and where it is
not clear the testimony is scientific, much less novel, the trial
judge should be given opportunity to assess the -testimony in a
Rule 104(a) context, drawing upon the Daubert standards. While
most sensible trial judges presumably would cut through the
verbiage and apply the right factors to reach the correct result,
an artificial novel/non-novel dichotomy can only serve to invite
confusion and error.
B. Of Barmeyer and Frye-One Test, Not Two
As noted above, the Montana Supreme Court continues to
cite both Barmeyer and Daubert, pointedly stating Barmeyer
"retains its vitality." The Barmeyer principle on which the Mon-
tana Supreme Court continues to rely is that "it is better to
admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other
expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-
145. Rosen v. CIBA-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996).
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examination and refutation."'4
After Daubert it is difficult to discern how Barmeyer could
possibly "retain its vitality." Under Daubert, scientific evidence
simply is not admitted "in the same manner as other expert
testimony." Rather, scientific evidence after Daubert is subject to
a two-prong, multi-factor test, which is not applied to other, non-
scientific forms of expert opinion. In that respect, federal courts
have noted that the "goal of Daubert" is to subject scientific
opinion testimony to a "more rigorous" standard of review.
147
The notion that scientific evidence is treated "the same as" other
forms of expert opinion after Daubert thus is not merely mislead-
ing, it is analytically false."
In this, a page of history may be worth a volume of logic. In
Barmeyer the Montana Supreme Court, after expressing its dis-
enchantment with the Frye test, adopted the "philosophy" articu-
lated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Baller.49 It is
from Baller that the language from Barmeyer quoted above is
derived. While Barmeyer apparently retains life in Montana
state courts, it seems doubtful the Baller decision on which it
was based still has a pulse. Since Daubert, the Baller decision
has been cited as having significance only to the "general accep-
tance" prong of the Daubert multi-factor test.'50 As noted above,
even under Daubert, the Frye test retains one lingering vestige of
life, in the form of the fourth prong of the Daubert test: "whether
the theory or technique has been generally accepted or rejected
in the particular scientific field." 5' In that regard, Frye has
been reincarnated thusly: "the methodology and reasoning used
by an expert witness should occupy a 'significant place in the
discourse of experts in the field.'"' 52 As characterized by the
Ninth Circuit, "in certain circumstances it may be sufficient if a
minority in the scientific community accepts the methods em-
ployed, but only if the proponent demonstrates in some 'objec-
tively verifiable way that the expert has both chose a reliable
scientific method and followed it faithfully.'"'53
146. Barmeyer, 202 Mont. 185, 193, 657 P.2d 594, 598.
147. See Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir.
1996).
148. See State v. Weeks, 270 Mont. 63, 891 P.2d 477, 491 (1995).
149. 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 561 (6th Cir. 1993).
151. Cline, 275 Mont. at 56, 909 P.2d at 1177.
152. Ballinger v. Atkins, 947 F. Supp. 925, 929 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing Cavallo
Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir. 1996)).
153. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1397 (D. Or. 1996)
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The basic sentiment expressed in Barmeyer-that opportuni-
ty for vigorous cross-examination is one safeguard against undue
jury reliance on "junk" science--undoubtedly still holds true after
Daubert. What is not true, however, is that this basic principle
somehow can be utilized as a substitute for the more exacting
Daubert test, as the Daubert majority seemed to expressly recog-
nize. In addressing concerns of the parties and amici, the
Daubert majority pointed out that abandonment of Frye would
not open the doors to "pseudoscientific" opinion.' "Convention-
al devices" are available to prevent a "free-for-all in which befud-
dled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational" expert opin-
ion, including "[v]igorous cross examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on burden of
proof."" These safeguards are in addition to, not an alterna-
tive of, the Daubert test. However, as the Supreme Court made
clear: "These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclu-
sion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test, are the
appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony
meets the standards of Rule 702."'5
For the foregoing reasons, this article respectfully submits
that continuing reliance on Barmeyer serves only to cloud the
issue. It should no longer be the case that scientific opinion that
fails the Daubert test may be admitted if adequate opportunities
for cross-examination and refutation are afforded. If Daubert is
to be the test in Montana-as the Montana Supreme Court has
said it will be-then Barmeyer can no longer retain its vitality,
except in a greatly restricted sense.
C. The Ladder of Admissibility Post-Daubert
Based upon existing case law, when confronted by a particu-
lar putative expert, the trial judge potentially may be called
upon to resolve at least the following issues:
(1) is the expert qualified;. 7
(quoting Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1319 n.11).
154. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
155. Id. at 591.
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. "Implicit in Rule 702 is the requirement that before a District Court allows
a witness designated as an expert to express an opinion, some foundation must be
laid to show that the expert has special training or education and adequate knowl-
edge on which to base an opinion." Cottrel v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 261 Mont. 296,
301, 863 P.2d 381, 384 (1994). When called as an expert, a witness must first show
his qualifications to speak with authority, and may then testify only as to those
1997]
27
Sterup: Into the Twilight Zone
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1997
492 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
(2) is the opinion derived from a proper factual founda-
tion;15
(3) is the subject matter amenable to expert opinion;159
matters on which he has peculiar knowledge. See Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co.,
95 Mont. 347, 353, 26 P.2d 973, 975 (1933). The party presenting a witness bears
the burden of establishing, to the satisfaction of the trial court, that the witness
possesses the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training and education to testify
as to the subject in issue. See O'Leyar v. Callendar, 255 Mont. 277, 843 P.2d 304
(1992); see also Glover v. Ballhagen, 232 Mont. 427, 756 P.2d 1166 (1988). An expert
lacking in expertise likely will not find his opinions entertained. So, for example, a
board certified ear, nose and throat specialist could not qualify as an expert as to
the standard of care of an oral surgeon. See Llera v. Wisner, 171 Mont. 254, 264,
557 P.2d 805, 811 (1976) (holding that a licensed chiropractor was not qualified to
give his opinion on injured worker's impairment rating based on guidelines formulat-
ed for use by licensed medical physicians); see also Wacker v. Park Rural Electric
Co-op., 239 Mont. 500, 501-02, 783 P.2d 360, 361 (1989) (holding that a plaintiff was
not qualified to give opinion testimony as to cause of his own physical illness); see
also Harrington v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 176 Mont. 37, 43, 575 P.2d 578, 581
(1978).
158. An expert may base an opinion on facts or data perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. See MONT. R. EVID. 703. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. See, e.g.,
Krueger v. General Motors Corp., 240 Mont. 266, 783 P.2d 1340 (1989); In Re Mar-
riage of Mitchell, 248 Mont. 105, 809 P.2d 582 (1991). For example, expert opinion
may be based upon hearsay. See In re Matter of J.M., 217 Mont. 300, 704 P.2d 1037
(1985). A medical expert may testify concerning health records made by other health
professionals if he has relied on them in forming opinions or inferences. See Diacon
v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 233 Mont. 515, 761 P.2d 401 (1988). In Jangula v. United
States Rubber, 47 Mont. 98, 98, 410 P.2d 462, 466-67 (1966) expert opinion was
excluded where the Court found that the "facts" referred to were "contrary to" what
the expert had "found to be the fact,' so that the hypothetical question and answer
were sheer speculation and not based upon evidence before the court. In Cottrell v.
Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 261 Mont. 296, 863 P.2d 381 (1993) the Montana Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of expert opinion, due to lack of
factual foundation for the opinion, where the medical expert, who proposed to express
an opinion apportioning plaintiffs symptoms and disability between two injuries
which occurred nine years apart had never examined the plaintiff, had never met or
talked with plaintiff, had not read plaintiffs deposition, had never talked with
plaintiffs treating physicians or read their depositions, was unaware of the type of
work done by plaintiff or the physical exertion plaintiff was capable of performing,
knew nothing about plaintiffs job description, and, most significantly, was "totally
unfamiliar with the traumatic event" which plaintiff alleged had caused his injury.
At the other end of the spectrum, in Montana Rail Link v. Byard, 260 Mont. 331,
860 P.2d 121 (1993) the court held that expert in "communications and clinical psy-
chology" properly relied on briefs of the parties, interviews of the plaintiff, an agreed
statement of facts, and the contentions of the parties in offering opinion testimony
regarding "interpersonal communications, particularly communication styles and how
they affect men and women in the work setting." Because the materials reviewed
were the "best available resources" and "would be used in the field of interpersonal
communications" the expert was justified in relying on them.
159. A matter generally qualifies where it is "not within the range of ordinary
training or intelligence," Kelly v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 P. 326 (1919),
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(4) does the expert hold his or her opinions with sufficient
certainty; 6
(5) assuming the expert purports to testify based on scientif-
ic knowledge: (a) is the opinion truly "scientific," (b) is the
expert's methodology sound, (c) has the expert applied the meth-
odology to the facts with sufficient precision;161 and in any case:
(6) would the opinion be helpful to the fact-finder in resolv-
ing an actual issue in the case, i.e., is there a "fit";l 2 and
or is "too complex to be really grasped by the average mind," Wibaux Realty Co. v.
N. Pac. Ry., 101 Mont. 126, 54 P.2d 1175 (1933), or is "sufficiently beyond common
experience." Wagner v. Cutler, 232 Mont. 332, 757 P.2d 779, 783 (1988); see also
Vandalia Ranch 221 Mont. at 253, 718 P.2d at 650. In a particularly colorful turn of
phrase, the Montana Supreme Court has stated expert witness testimony is allowed
if the evidence or fact in issue is "beyond the ken" of the ordinary juror. See Smith
v. Roosevelt County, 242 Mont. 27, 788 P.2d 895 (1990). While litigators may dis-
agree as to the scope of the average juror's "ken," it seems to be understood this
means something "beyond common experience," such that a expert's "superior knowl-
edge and experience enable him to deduce effects from cause and draw a conclusion
which the trier of facts could not draw because of lack of such knowledge." Vandalia
Ranch, 221 Mont. at 253, 718 P.2d at 653. Thus, expert evidence long has been
permitted regarding "scientific" or "technical" matters, for the common sense reason
that such testimony is needed to help jurors understand and determine the facts of
the case. Smith, 242 Mont. at 27, 788 P.2d at 899. Finally:
The necessity for opinion evidence only exists where the facts in controversy
are incapable of being detailed and described so as to give the jury an
intelligible understanding concerning them; but when the facts are such as
can be detailed or described, and the jurors are capable to understand and
draw a correct conclusion from them without such opinion evidence, the
necessity for it does not exist.
Demarais v. Johnson, 90 Mont. 366, 371, 3 P.2d 283, 285 (1931).
160. In Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 148 Mont. 13, 417 P.2d 95 (1966) the
plaintiff claimed that a single traumatic injury was the cause of cancer and the
plaintiffs medical expert testified that the "most possible and probable cause" of the
Plaintiff's cancer was the trauma. The Montana Supreme Court held that such expert
opinion was insufficient as a matter of law. Id. In Young v. Horton, 259 Mont. 34,
855 P.2d 502 (1993) however, the court held that expert medical testimony which
was not expressed in the form of a conclusion to a "reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty" was nevertheless admissible, where the testimony was not given in the form
of an opinion, but rather was based on the experts' own experience. The Court found
that under Rule 702 an expert may testify in the form of "an opinion or otherwise,"
and that the proffered testimony was acceptable in form under the rule. Id. In
Farris v. Clark, 58 Mont. 33, 487 P.2d 1307 (1971) the medical expert testified that
it was "possible" or "probable" that a ruptured disk had been caused by a rear-end
collision and the Montana Supreme Court reversed a jury award for the plaintiff,
finding that the expert testimony was too speculative to support the award.
161. See text and notes discussed supra at 46-62.
162. State v. Stringer, 271 Mont. 367, 377, 897 P.2d 1063, 1069 (1995) (holding
that while expert testimony on "battered spouse syndrome" is generally admissible in
Montana, the evidence should not have been admitted on the facts of the case, since
the State failed to lay an appropriate foundation that the complainant was a bat-
tered spouse).
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(7) does the relevance of the opinion outweigh its prejudicial
effect?"6
The trial judge should not hesitate to utilize the preliminary
hearing provisions of Rule 104(a) to address expert opinion ad-
missibility issues. The 104(a) hearing most often is employed
when a Daubert challenge is presented, although the mechanism
need not be so limited. Given the increased rigor of the Daubert
test, litigants and judges would be well-advised to plan a Rule
104(a) hearing well in advance of trial in any case where com-
plex expert testimony is anticipated.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the sheer complexity of the task, variations in inter-
pretation by and among the Montana state and federal courts
can only serve to unnecessarily complicate the lives of trial judg-
es, litigants and litigators. If such inconsistencies are permitted
to proliferate, a particular party espousing a particularly contro-
versial scientific principle might be tempted to forum shop, in
hopes of achieving a better result under one or the other system.
To avoid such results, the Montana Supreme Court should follow
the federal courts in making clear the two-part Daubert test is
not limited to "novel" science. Continuing reliance on Barmeyer
should not be made. This article submits that application on the
Daubert test to all expert opinion is the better course, although
for now courts have not reached consensus on the issue, and the
Ninth Circuit has stated to the contrary. To the extent the Mon-
tana state and federal courts are uniform in their interpretation
of Rule 702 and Daubert, the state's trial judges will be able to
better and more efficiently administer justice in a particular
casey
163. See text and notes discussed supra at 94-100.
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